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30 Май 2015 @ 09:27
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Оригинал взят у wyradhe в Клюге в протоколах Нюрнбергского трибунала
Клюге в протоколах Нюрнбергского трибунала

- КЛЮГЕ: (Герсдорфу, в конце июля 1944, в ответ на предложение открыть Западный фронт союзникам и свергнуть таким образом режим): - Герсдорф, если такое дело пойдет плохо, то фельдмаршал фон Клюге окажется величайшей свиньей в мировой истории.
ГЕРСДОРФ: - Господин фельдмаршал, все великие люди в мировой истории оказывались перед риском [в зависимости от исхода их попытки] либо быть осужденным историей, либо войти в нее как спаситель в обстоятельствах крайней необходимости.
КЛЮГЕ: - Герсдорф, фельдмаршал фон Клюге - не 'великий человек' (Gersdorff, der Feldmarschall v. Kluge ist kein großer Mann).
(NB. По-видимому, он как раз и готовил тогда открытие Западного фронта, только не хотел об этом говорить Герсдорфу).

Фельдмаршал Клюге исключительно непопулярен в немецкой историографии: биографии его нет до сих пор, имеется вместо нее:
8-cтраничный очерк графа Тун-Хоэнштайна в "Милитергешихте" за 1994, упоминавшийся выше;
относительно большая, но отвратительная по качеству (там масса ключевых фактов даже не упомянута) статья Петера Штейнбаха, специалиста по Сопротивлению, в 1995 (Peter Steinbach: Hans Günther von Kluge - Ein Zauderer im Zwielicht // Die Militärelite des "Dritten Reiches". Berlin 1995, 288-324);
7-страничная справочка в Hitlers militärische Elite Юбершера (1998 и др., мне недоступна);
и целая одна неопубликованная дипломная работа одного студента в 2008 г. на сотню страниц (Clemens Schaeffer. Günter von Kluge (1882-1944). Ein Generalfeldmarschall zwischen Gehorsam und Widerstand. Eingereicht: Mai 2008. Freie Universität Berlin. Friedrich-Meinecke-Institut. Fachbereich Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften).
Очерк Ричарда Лэмба (Richard Lamb. Kluge // Corelli Barnett, ed. Hitler's Generals. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, 395-409, был в русском переводе) на этом фоне выигрывает уже потому, что сообщения автора частично восходят к материалам рассказов немецких офицеров и генералов Лиддел Гарту и другим в 40-х годах, почти ничего из которых потом не публиковались.

Клюге не очень подходит для популярности в Германии потому, что никак не втискивается в приятную нынешней очень-очень-антинацистской Германии мифологию. Мифология эта очень сходна с рассказами взахлеб честертоновского Грина-"Эксмура" ("Лиловый парик") о сверхпреступной истории рода Эксмуров. "Грешники-то мы превеличайшие в мире, никто-никто в мире не был такими ужасными грешниками! Германский народ в силу своих печальных предрассудков расизма, коллективизма, национализма, лукизма, эйблизма и фетфобии был обманут Уникально Сатанинскими Нацистами и поддался им. Самые Честные Истинные Немцы видели Уникальное Сатанинство Нацизма с самого начала, говорили ему свое решительное пфуй и никогда не служили Царству Сатаны, а с ним боролись. Другие Честные, но недостаточно зрячие Истинные Немцы сначала ничего такого не видели, но потом (обычно после Сталинграда - это было особенно в ходу до 1990-х; узнав году этак в 42-м о Холокосте - это с 1990-х) прозрели и тут уж стали бороться с Царством Сатаны, не думая о последствиях, а равно и преодолевать наследие Сатаны = грешность в себе самих. Все же остальные суть падшие, и нам за них очень-очень горько и стыдно, хоть и им тоже прощение и искупление, кроме тех, кому не причитается ни того, ни другого по нашим праведным законам".
Дешево и вкусно.

В последнее время ценз для попадания в категорию Честных Истинных Немцев все повышается, и участники Сопротивления из состава вермахта, находившиеся хоть на сколько-то ответственных должностях, постепенно начинают из нее вычеркиваться: они же служили оружием Царству Сатаны на этих самых своих должностях.

Клюге во все эти хоралы не вписывается: он не прозревал, поскольку с самого начала считал нацистов преступными бандитами, а Гитлера - "свиньей"; при этом он не собирался уходить из армии и участвовал во всех войнах Германии, стараясь делать это дело как можно лучше; при этом он многократно по самым разным поводам выступал против преступных дел Германии в касающихся его хотя бы косвенно сферах (в этом отношении он с отрывом выделяется даже среди тех, вообще очень немногих, генералов, у которых эти дела вызывали серьезное негодование; были и те, кто, не волнуясь обо всех таких вещах, хотя бы просто осуждали их, но и таких было немного), а преступность отсчитывал даже не по германской мерке 1914 года, а по меркам Западной Европы 1900 года и по духу (даже не букве) тогдашних конвенций; при этом в заговорах против Гитлера он был с 1937 года; при этом он еще как думал о последствиях для Германии, когда обдумывал те или другие возможные акции сопротивления и свое возможное в них участие; при этом он не открывался ни приятелям и соратникам, ни врагам. Он был сам по себе, и в армии был сам по себе, и в составе Сопротивления был сам по себе, и даже погиб из-за этого сугубо отдельно от других. Он не подходил ни для каких ферейнов хорового пения, ни нацистских, ни антинацистских, никаких. Так что героем немецкой культуры ему не бывать, пока /если она не перестанет быть культурой хорового пения на ту или иную тему. Петь хором можно (всякие Хорствессели и Многовней-Лесовполей - особенно), а думать хором нельзя.

Знакомство с фельдмаршалом Клюге лучше всего, мне кажется, начинать с материалов Нюрнбергского трибунала. Возможно, я так думаю лишь потому, что сам начал это знакомство лет 20 назад именно с них. Он в этих материалах упоминается неоднократно, всегда - случайно, периферийно, по самым разным поводам и почти всегда как-то удивительно однообразно по общей их сути: не всплывает ни одного случая отдачи им преступных приказов, зато постоянно всплывают случаи его борьбы с преступными приказами и практикой (или их неприятия) или упоминания его антинацизма и/или участия в заговорах против Гитлера с 1930-х и далее. Говорившие это не были как-то специально связаны с Клюге и не хотели этими сообщениями о нем помочь ни ему (он был давно в могиле), ни себе (эти упоминания Клюге никак их самих не выгораживали), ни кому-либо еще, так что сомневаться в этих сообщениях не приходится.

Ниже приведены все эти сообщения, перенумерованные, по-английски.

Но сначала кратко - резюме по-русски:

[Текст 1] (NB: как видно из сообщения Роттигера,предписанные приказами ОКХ-ОКВ расстрелы пленных по категориям были в какой-то момент номинально перепоручены высшим командованием от военных, которым первоначально это приказывалось, отрядам СД (РСХА), действующим при армии, которым военные и должны были передавать пленных соответствующих категорий. Эта новая линия командования могла быть вызвана только настояниями каких-то генералов на тему о том, что пленных убивать нельзя и приказы такие несовместимы с военным достоинством. Как независимо известно, Клюге был один из главных среди этих протестантов - вообще весьма немногих); Клюге "многократно призывал войска не вести противопартизанскую борьбу с излишней жестокостью, большей, чем требовалось по ситуации - борьбу следовало направлять на уничтожение [партизанского] противника лишь после того, как провалились бы все попытки принудить его к сдаче в плен", и, соответственно, Клюге при этом требовал щадить партизан, если они сдавались в плен; весной-летом 1942 Клюге предписал отрядам СД убраться из прифронтовой полосы на том основании, что они своими "казнями евреев и других лиц... разъяряли местное население"!

[Текст 2] Клюге в июле 1941 вмешивается в практику гражданских служб забирать гражданских пленных из лагеря пленных в своей тыловой зоне – в Минске – на принудительный труд и запрещает гражданским службам эту практику. Запретил он тогда такое привлечение и вообще кому бы то ни было, кроме себя самого. (Тут он, надо сказать, просчитался. Он пытался в данном случае резко сократить привлечение даже гражданских пленных к принудительному труду – никакой другой цели, например, сохранения соответствующих контигентов от конкурентов для такого же использования их самим Клюге, тут быть не могло, так как армия и без того могла привлекать большие массы населения к принудительному труду, да и добровольцев на работы хватало, и, наконец, для такой цели было бы достаточно заявить приоритет армии перед другими желающими в деле изымания гражданских пленных на принудработы. Вместо этого Клюге вообще запретил такое забирание и гражданским, и военным инстанциям, переведя его в единоличную свою компетенцию. Но на деле пленным даже на работах было бы все же не так плохо, чем в большинстве лагерей, где их потом массово уморили голодом).

[Тексты 3, 4, 6] Уже в 1937 Клюге согласился по просьбе оппозиции попробовать привлечь Фрича и Бломберга к идее путча против Гитлера и всего его режима, поскольку по мнению, которое разделял Клюге, «дела идут все более и более крайним образом» и имеет место «экстремизм», а «террор должен быть пресечен всеми возможными мерами». Речь при этом шла не только о путче против гестапо, но о путче против всего режима. Клюге говорил тогда Гизевиусу, что он убежден, что Фрич «выжидает нужного момента, поднимет в один прекрасный день мятеж и покончит с террором». Шахт к 1937 считал, что именно к Клюге и другим «таким генералам, как он» нужно обратиться по вопросу о подготовке скорейшего путча против режима (т.е. в определенных кругах было кое-что известно о соответствующих взглядах Клюге).

[Текст 5] Клюге на рубеже 1942/1943 г. года согласился на предложение группы Бека осуществить следующий план: Паулюс в Сталинграде поднимет мятеж и издаст воззвание к армии и народу против Гитлера, обвинив его в катастрофе и разжигая тем самым против него армию и народ (вскоре после чего капитулирует), а как только Паулюс издаст это воззвание, то Клюге в ответ на этот призыв открыто объявит свою группу армий не подчиняющейся приказам Гитлера, а к нему присоединится кто-то еще на востоке, Вицлебен же согласился одновременно поднять мятеж на Западе (т.н. план «сталинградского путча», известный и независимо). Посреди вызванной этим сумятицы должен был выступить сам Бек, провозгласив себя верховным военным правителем в Берлине, а Вицлебен и Клюге признали бы его в этом качестве. Поскольку Паулюс наотрез отказал Беку, то и весь этот план отпал.

[Тексты 7а + 7b + 9]Узнав, что германские службы принудительно угоняют из его тыловой зоны советских граждан на работы в Германии, вплоть до того, что (как сообщили Клюге) как-то оцепили кинотеатр, задержали его посетителей и с места увезли на работы, Клюге написал Заукелю (возглавлявшему использование иностранной рабочей силы в Германии вне лагерей), приведя ему, в частности, этот пример, заявляя, что идет недопустимая «охота на людей», требуя, чтобы Заукель пресек такие меры и по возможности сводил дело к добровольному найму на работы в Германию. В результате Заукель даже сам явился на оккупированную территорию назначил там расследования некоторых особенных эксцессов и какие-то из них сократил, хотя, конечно, принудительности он искоренять и не собирался.

[Текст 8а + 8b + 8с] В июле 1944 Клюге, тогда главнокомандующий на Западе, получил от ОКХ приказ обеспечить принудительную отправку французских рабочих в рейх согласно договоренности рейха с Лавалем. Клюге ответил, что начнет все это делать, отдав для начала дополнительные директивы по этому поводу, а на деле вообще не стал выполнять этот приказ.Много позже Шпеер сказал: «и вероятия не могло быть, чтобы при той обстановке и учитывая убеждения Клюге» он стал бы выполнять этот приказ".

[Текст 10] В конце мая 1941 Клюге позвонил из Варшавы своему командующему фон Боку и заявил ему по своей инициативе, что приказ о расстреле каких-либо военнопленных совершенно недопустим и что его нельзя выполнять, учитывая-де поддержание дисциплины в войсках. Фон Бок согласился и они обсудили, что можно было бы предпринять против этого приказа. (Это начало независимо известных, растянувшихся на год попыток Клюге добиться отмены этого приказа, завершившихся тем, что Гитлер отменил его обязательную силу и предоставил командирам самим решать, брать в плен комиссаров или нет. Ср. Варлимонт, «В ставке Гитлера»: «6 мая 1942 года, то есть через год после подготовки армией первого проекта приказа [о комиссарах], официальный журнал исторического отдела ОКВ содержит следующую запись: «Фюрер отдает распоряжение, что с целью повысить готовность к дезертирству или капитуляции советских войск, которые находятся в окружении, временно и в порядке эксперимента разрешается в таких случаях гарантировать жизнь командирам, комиссарам и политрукам». Насколько я помню, это распоряжение Гитлера появилось в результате личных протестов фельдмаршала фон Клюге. Фактически это означало формальную отмену приказа о комиссарах» [на самом деле, лишь частичную отмену, которую просто могли бы особо желающие де-факто использовать и шире]).

***
Если случайная выборка упоминаний в Нюрнбергском процессе со стороны незаинтересованных в каком-то обелении Клюге лиц имеет вот такой характер, - то неудивительно, что столкнувшись с этой подборкой, я сильно заинтересовался таким уникальным для вермахта и не так чтоб обычным для любой армии и общества мира военачальником.


1. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 4. TWENTY-EIGHTH DAY Monday, 7 January 1946

...three statements by General Hans Rottiger,which will be Affidavits Numbers 15 and 16: Exhibit USA-559, Document Number 3713-PS; and USA-560, Document Number 3714-PS. General Rottiger attained the rank of general of panzer troops, the equivalent of a lieutenant general in the American Army, and was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center on the Eastern Front, during the period of which he speaks.

The first statement is as follows:
"As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with antipartisan warfare. For the execution of these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the army group and of the army, as, for example, security battalions.
"At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders Jews, political commissars, and agents were delivered up to the SD.
"The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order from the highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the anti-partisan war can only have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the military struggle of the Army against the partisans."

The second statement:

"Supplementary to my first declaration of 8 December 1945, I declare:
"As I stated orally on 28 November 1945, my then commander of the 4th Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners, since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans.

"Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans, there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women, too, were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries, and then only from time to time, were partisans in evidence when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account, on the orders of Army Group Center, to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south."

The third statement by Rottiger, Number 16:

"During my period of service, from May 1942 to June 1943, as Chief of Staff of the 4th Army of the Army Group Center, SD units were attached in the beginning, apparently for the purpose of counter-intelligence activity in front-line areas. It was clear later on that these SD units were causing great disturbances among the local civilian population, with the result that my commanding officer therefore asked the commander of the Army Group, Field Marshal Von Kluge, to order the SD units to clear out of the front-line areas, which took place immediately. The reason for this, first and foremost, was that the excesses of the SD units, by way of execution of Jews and other persons, assumed such proportions as to threaten the security of the army in its combat areas because of the infuriated civilian populace. Although in general the special tasks of the SD units were well known and appeared to be carried out with the knowledge of the highest military authorities, we opposed these methods as far as possible because of the danger which existed for our troops, as I have mentioned above."


2. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 7. FIFTY-NINTH DAY. Thursday, 14 February 1946

...Document Number USSR-354... is a report on the prison camp in Minsk. The report was compiled in Rosenberg's office on 10 July 1941. ...Page 183: "The prison camp in Minsk, covering a space about the size of the Wilhelmsplatz, accommodates about one hundred
thousand prisoners of ever and forty thousand civilian prisoners... The only possible language for a small guard, which remains on duty both day and night without being relieved, is the firearm, of which ruthless use is made".
Next, the authors of this document complain about the impossibility of carrying out the selection of prisoners according to physical and racial classification for various forms of hard labor: "On the second day this selection of civilian prisoners was forbidden to the O.T. [организация Тодта], referring to an order of General Field Marshal Kluge, according to which he alone had the right to release civilian prisoners."

3. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 12. ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH DAY Wednesday, 24 April 1946

GISEVIUS: Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Muenster was that the president of the province, Freiherr Von Luening, was a man of the old school-clean, correct, a professional civil servant and politically a man who upheld law and order. He, too, ended on the gallows after 20 July 1944. I also got into touch in Duesseldorf with Regierungspraesident State Secretary Schmidt, and immediately upon my arrival in Muenster I did everything to get into touch with the commanding general there, Von Kluge, who later became Field Marshal. In this I succeeded. There, too, I tried at once to continue my old political discussions.

...GISEVIUS: ...Schacht tried to approach Baron Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As, however, he was very difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank vice president, Dreyse, to establish the contact. We also made one big attempt to approach Fritsch and Blomberg through General Von Kluge.
DR. DIX: And, briefly, what was the object of that step? What were the generals supposed to do-I mean these generals mentioned by you?
GISEVIUS: This step had as its object to make it clear to Blomberg that things were taking a more and more extreme turn, that the economy of the country had deteriorated, and that the Gestapo terror must be stopped by all possible means.
DR. DIX: So that at the time there were only misgivings about the economy and the terror which reigned-not about the danger of war, not yet?
GISEVIUS: No, only the fear of extremism.

...GISEVIUS: ...One of the greatest disasters was the fact that so many people in Germany imagined that Fritsch was a strong man. I remember that not only high-ranking officers but also high ministerial officials told me over and over again that there was no need to worry: Fritsch was on the march; Fritsch was only waiting for the right moment; Fritsch would one fine day bring about a revolt and end the terror. General Von Kluge, for instance, told me this as a fact-and he was a close friend of Fritsch. And so we all lived in the completely mistaken belief-as I can now say-that one day the great revolt would come of the Armed Forces against the SS. But instead of this, the exact opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, the famous Fritsch crisis, the result of which was that not only Fritsch was relieved of his post but that the entire Armed Forces leadership was beheaded, politically speaking, which meant that now all our hope . .

4. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 12. ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY Friday, 26 April 1946

DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness; did you discuss with Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch an intended Putsch against the regime or only against the Gestapo?
GISEVIUS: I discussed both with him; and in both cases he answered in the affirmative and acted in the negative. I spoke to Balder and Witzleben. I knew Kluge well from the old times. I do not know at what period he entered the category to which you refer. At any rate my connection with Kluge was never broken off. I may have talked to other individuals falling within this category... In the course of years it [разговоров с этими генералами] may have been a dozen or several dozen, but I should like to say that it was the task of Generaloberst Beck and Oster or Canaris to talk to these gentlemen rather than mine. As regards names, I cannot give you much of the information you want; on the other hand I can shorten your question by saying that, unfortunately, very few of the leading generals in the appointments referred to by the Prosecution ever seriously declared their intention of helping to overthrow the system.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, that is exactly what I want to know. You spoke to Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Halder, and Witzleben?
GISEVIUS: And Olbricht.
DR. LATERNSER: He did not belong to this group. You did speak to these three, then?
GISEVIUS: Also to Kluge.
DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the intended Putsch?
GISEVIUS: Yes, of course.
DR. LATERNSER: And of these four that you mentioned did Field Marshal Von Witzleben agree?
GISEVIUS: They all agreed to begin with. Witzleben was the only one who stuck to his word.

5. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 12. ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH DAY Thursday, 25 April 1946

DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?
GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of 1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to plan, was to start the revolt in the East.
DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt?
GISEVIUS: No, a little later.

...GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General Von Manstein's answer of the year 1942. To Beck's strictly military explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost.
Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von Manstein to our side.
At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he, in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the Fuehrer's headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel, between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had avowed himself to be persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: "We were deserted."

...GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.

6. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 2. ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH DAY Thursday, 2 May 1946

SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups in Germany one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the Hitler regime. Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I got to know that all those circles in which I had placed my hope were failing, namely the scientists, the educated middle class, and the leaders of economy. ...In a word, one could not rely upon these circles. Consequently, one could depend only on the generals, on the military, because according to my conception at the time, one could certainly count on an armed resistance even by the SS bodyguard. Therefore, as has been stated here-and I do not want to pursue it further-I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military there were people with whom one could speak openly. And this first occasion led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in the course of time.
DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937...

7а. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 15. ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST DAY. Wednesday, 29 May 1946

SAUCKEL: When on a visit to Field Marshal Kluge, I heard from him that he had been informed that in the area of his army, or army group, a cinema had been surrounded and the people attending the cinema had been brought to Germany to work. I immediately had that case most carefully investigated, and the investigation took 3 months. Witnesses will be able to testify to that when they appear here. The result of the investigation was the following: It was not a case of labor recruitment for Germany. A construction unit near Rovno was celebrating in that cinema the end of one of its tasks; and in the middle of that celebration the order was received that this unit had to be put on a new job, a different place of work. The contractor thereupon interrupted the celebration in a very drastic way by having the immediate transport of these workers carried out by a force of police. That, of course, had nothing to do with my work and my organization; but it took me 3 months to discover the true facts of this complaint by Field Marshal Kluge. In every case where such complaints came to my attention I investigated and dealt with them and condemned them, because they did not help me.

+ 7b. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 18. ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST DAY. Thursday, 18 July 1946

DR. SERVATIUS: ...The Defendant Sauckel was also supported in this idea by the result of an investigation into the details of a "manhunt" which was reported to him at Minsk by Field Marshal Kluge; it turned out to be a round-up of workers employed by a private firm at the time of the retreat.

8a. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 15. ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND DAY. Thursday, 30 May 1946

M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to produce a document which refers to 3 or 4 days after this meeting of ministers [11 июля]. It is a telegram from Defendant Keitel, Document Number F-814, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-1516. It is a telegram addressed by Defendant Keitel to all military commanders. I call your attention to the fact that it bears the stamp of the labor department of the military commander in France. This is dated 15 July and here is the text of it... This document contains the instructions which Keitel gave in connection with this meeting of leaders [11 июля 1944]. I read the second paragraph: "The present situation demands the use of all conceivable means for the procurement of additional labor, because it is the fighting men who benefit first of all by all armament measures. In view of this fact, all questions concerning internal unrest, the increase of resistance and such matters must be put in the background. We must concentrate on giving every help and support to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. I refer to my directives for the co-operation of the Wehrmacht in the procurement of workers from France"

+ 8b. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 16. ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH DAY Thursday, 20 June 1946

DR. FLACHSNER: The French Prosecution has presented a Document Number 814, Exhibit RF-1516...
According to this order troops were to round up workers in the West. Please give a brief statement on that. So as to refresh your memory, I want to say that reference is made in this telegram to the meeting of 11 July.
SPEER: The minutes of the meeting show, as I said before, that I opposed measures of coercion. I did not see Keitel's actual order [Exhibit RF-1516].
DR. FLACHSNER: Number 824 is another document submitted by the French Prosecution on the same subject. It is a letter by General Von Kluge dated 25 July 1944; Exhibit RF-515. It refers to the telegram from Keitel which has been previously mentioned. Do you know anything about it, and whether that order was ever actually carried out?
SPEER: I know that the order was not carried out. To understand the situation, it is necessary to become familiar with the atmosphere prevailing about 20 July. At that time not every order from headquarters was carried out. As the investigations after 20 July proved, at that time in his capacity as Commander, West, Kluge was already planning negotiations with the western enemies for a capitulation and probably he made his initial attempts at that time. That, incidentally, was the reason for his suicide after the attempt of 20 July had failed. It is out of the question... It is out of the question that Field Marshal Kluge, in the military situation in which he found himself, and considering his views, should have given orders for raids and measures of coercion at that moment. The release of the Sauckel-Laval agreement, which was mentioned in this document, had no practical significance, since the blocked factories were maintained, and thus this agreement could not become effective. This was well known to the officials in France, and the best proof for the fact that the order was not carried out is Document RF-22 of the French Prosecution, which shows that in July 1944 only 3,000 workers came to Germany from France. If the military authorities had used measures of coercion, it would have been a simple matter to send a very much larger number of workers than these 3,000 from France to Germany.

+ 8c. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 15. ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND DAY. Thursday, 30 May 1946

M. HERZOG: I submit Document F-824, which I hand to the Tribunal as Exhibit RF-1515. This Document F-824 is a letter from the Commander of the West, from his headquarters, dated 25 July 1944. I quote: "One can conclude from this that on the order of the Fuehrer, and after the abrogation of all contrary decrees, the desires of the Plenipotentiary General for the allocation of Labor..." This Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor is you yourself [Sauckel]; is that not so? "...and of Reich Minister Speer must in principle be carried out. Following my telegraphic communication, on the basis of the conference of ministers of 11 July in the Reich Chancellery, concerning which the Commander of the West will be informed by the military commander, the following directives are in force from now on: "Without taking into account justified misgivings concerning security and order within the country, recruiting must start everywhere where the possibilities referred to in my telegram present themselves. As an only exception the Fuehrer has decided that in the actual fighting zone no methods of coercion will be used against the population as long as the latter are helpful to the Wehrmacht. On the other hand, the recruiting of volunteers among refugees from the combat zones is to be handled energetically. Moreover, all means will be considered justified, in order to recruit as much labor as possible from elsewhere by means at the disposal of the Wehrmacht."
Do you again deny that at your request, and at that of Reich Minister Speer, troop units carried out the recruiting of labor?
SAUCKEL: I should like to remark in this connection that I do not dispute what has just been described. At that time the commander-in-chief was under the stress of battle and the evacuation of the population. But I can testify that after the date of 25 July 1944 these things did not apply any longer, for the withdrawal of German troops was much too rapid; so that this decree, which had been issued by the Fuehrer, was no longer in effect.
M. HERZOG: Do you remember the conference, the ministers' conference of 11 July 1944, to which the document I have just read refers?
SAUCKEL: Yes, I recall it.
...THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read the last passage in Document F-824-that is, not the last, but the last on that page beginning with "Afin...." It is on Page 346 of the French translation.
M. HERZOG: "In order to make the measures undertaken as effective as possible, the troops must be informed of the necessity of the Arbeitseinsatz organization so that they may put down the many acts of subversive and open resistance. The field commanders and military administration offices must give as much aid as possible to the delegates of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor and refrain from encroaching on their activities which are in conformance with instructions. I therefore ask you to give the necessary directions to this effect..."
Do you still deny that at your request the Army was used for the recruitment of workers?
THE PRESIDENT: There is a passage on the next page, too, in the supplementary note, Paragraph 1.
M. HERZOG: "Supplementary note by the Commander of the West.
"The Commander of the West reported to the Chief of the OKW on 23 July as follows:
"1) In spite of anxieties concerning internal security, I have authorized the application of the Sauckel-Laval agreement of 12 May 1944.
"2) I shall issue further instructions for the application of these measures in the combat zone in agreement with OKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw. 1) 2 (West) Number 05201/44, Secret, of 8 July 1944.
"The Commander of the West, signed Von Kluge, Field Marshal."
"Further instructions follow. For the Commander of the West. The Chief of the General Staff," et cetera.


9. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 15. ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD DAY. Friday, 31 May 1946

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In your statements to your defense counsel you declared that no cases of criminal or illegal methods of compulsory recruitment had ever come to your knowledge. Then what was the reason for such extensive trips to the occupied territories? Does it mean that some indication had already reached you that large-scale, illegal practices were taking place in the process of labor recruitment? Was that the reason for your journeys? You visited over 10 cities.
SAUCKEL: May I inform you, Mr. Prosecutor, while we are on this subject, that my defense counsel has already asked me that question and that I answered it with "yes," and that, generally speaking, whenever complaints reached me I discussed them with Rosenberg, and that wherever a wrong could be righted it was righted...
GEN. ALEXANDROV: ...I should now like to ascertain that you took those trips in order to improve methods of recruitment. I have come to the logical conclusion that in all these towns, prior to your arrival, a certain lawlessness had prevailed and crimes had been committed during the recruiting of manpower. That is what I am speaking about. And now will you give me a definite answer as to why you visited these places?
SAUCKEL: I have already answered that question in every respect. However, I would add that I assume that you, Mr. Prosecutor, have yourself had sufficient administrative experience to realize that in every department, anywhere in every country of the world, it is a matter of course that administrative orders should be checked. One does not need to know that mistakes are made in human life and in every human organization; a control must be exercised all the same.
GEN. ALEXANDROV: If you deny that you went there in order to improve conditions and to suppress the crimes perpetrated in the course of labor recruitment, then you must have gone there to accelerate the deportation of manpower into Germany. It is one thing or the other. Choose for yourself.
SAUCKEL: No, I must emphatically deny that. I undertook these journeys in order to satisfy myself, within the scope of my duties, how this task was being carried out, and to stop defects which were reported to me, as for instance-as I once told my defense counsel during my interrogation-I had also been asked to do so by Field Marshal Kluge. But I also wanted to look into matters carefully and myself give appropriate admonitions and instructions to the departments. My best evidence of this is the manifesto produced during this journey.
...
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You never got any reports or complaints of what you call a catastrophic nature; is that right?
SAUCKEL: Within Germany-I received reports and complaints such as I described to my counsel from Field Marshal Kluge, or else they were made known to me in discussions with Rosenberg. Immediately I took the necessary measures. But that was not frequently the case...
TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): ...You used the expression "catastrophic nature;" those were your words. Did you get any reports of a catastrophic nature?
SAUCKEL: I learned through Field Marshal Kluge, and through reports, which have been mentioned here, from Rosenberg, about a few cases which I considered catastrophic and tried to correct.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): These were what you call catastrophic cases?
SAUCKEL: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What were they?
SAUCKEL: There was the case in the East which Field Marshal Kluge reported to me, where motion picture houses were surrounded by recruiting agents. I considered that catastrophic. The second case was the case of the returning transport, where according to the report-it is called the later report, but I do not remember the number of the document-children are said to have died on the way and been placed outside the train. I considered that catastrophic.

10. Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 17. ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH DAY. Monday, 1 July 1946

DR. STAHMER: ... I want to ask you whether you had an opportunity personally to ascertain the attitude of Field Marshal Kluge, your commander of Army Group Center, regarding the shooting of prisoners of war?
VON EICHBORN: By chance I became the ear-witness of a conversation between the Commanders Bock and Kluge. That conversation took place about 3 or 4 weeks before the beginning of the Russian campaign. I cannot tell you the exact time. At the time Field Marshal Von Bock was the commander of Army Group Center, and Field Marshal Von Kluge was commander of the 4th Army. The army group was in Posen and the 4th Army at Warsaw. One day I was called by the aide-de-camp of Field Marshal Von Bock, who was Lieutenant Colonel Count Hardenberg. He gave me the order...
THE PRESIDENT: These details are entirely irrelevant, aren't they. All you want to ask him is: What was the attitude of Von Kluge? That is all.
DR. STAHMER: The answer did not come through. I did not understand what you said, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: What I said was that all these details about the particular place where Von Kluge met some other army group commander are utterly irrelevant. All you are trying to ask him is: What was Von Kluge's attitude toward the murder of war prisoners? Isn't that all?
DR. STAHMER: Yes. [Turning to the witness.] Will you answer the question briefly, Witness. Please just tell us what Von Kluge said.
VON EICHBORN: Von Kluge told Von Bock, during a telephone conversation, that the order for the shooting of certain prisoners of war was an impossibility and could not be carried out, with regard to the discipline of the troops. Von Bock shared this point of view and both these gentlemen talked for half an hour about the measures which they wanted to adopt against this order.